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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEROY R. CLARK, et al, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
JAMES T. EREKSON, et al 
Defendants arnd Respondents. 
Case 
No. 9005 
BRIEF O,F RESPONDENT'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts appearing in the brief of 
Appellant Clark is substantially more accurate than that 
appearing in the brief of Appellant Thompson. To avoid 
confusion Respondents elect to restate the facts. There 
has existed for more than fifty (50) years, and Respond-
ents contend since prior to the issuance of any patents 
to land in the area, a road running North and South at 
what would be 7th East Street from Vine Street on the 
North to 5900 South Street on the South. Immediately 
North of the juncture of this road and Vine Street, Vine 
1 
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Street runs in a 'North and South direction for a sub-
stantial distance and the West fence line of Vine Street 
and the West fence line of the road in question are in 
direct alignment. 
At a point approximately five hundred feet South of 
the juncture o! the road in question with Vine Street, 
Appellant Clark was the owner of a tract of land abutting 
the road on the East and Respondent Crabtree is the 
owner of tract of land abutting the road on the West 
immediately opposite the Clark property. Respondent 
Erekson is the owner of land abutting upon the West side 
of the road both North and South of the Crabtree prop-
erty and lan? abutting upon the East side of the road 
South of the Clark property. In December, 1953, Re-
spondents Clark conveyed the North portion of their 
property being that immediately opposite the Crabtree 
property to Respondent Clyde R. Thompson. The de-
scription in this Deed so far as it relates to the West line 
of the property, that is the property abutting upon the 
road, is substantially different than the description of the 
West boundary in the Deed by which Clark acquired title 
to this property, the difference being that the West 
boundary of Clark's property as described in his deed 
of acquisition, was the center of an open street, "four 
chains East of the Southwest corner of the Northwest 
corner of Section seventeen ( 17) '', and was a due North 
and South straight line, whereas in his deed of convey-
ance to Respondent Thompson, he described the West line 
of the property as commencing at. a point 3.74 chains East 
from the same quarter corner. The West line also ~hows 
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an offset of . 754 rods, and a course South 0 degrees 18 
minutes 30 seconds East, rather than a North-South 
course. Clark endeavored to obtain from Respondents a 
Quitclaim Deed to the property representing the differ-
ence between the land he acquired and the land which 
he deeded Appellant Thompson and when Respondents 
refused to give him such a deed, he commenced this action. 
The road from Vine Street down to the North boun-
dary of what is now the Thompson property, was the sub-
ject of an action in 1928 in the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Case No. 40279, between J. T. Erekson, 
father of Respondent Erekson, and McClanahan, who 
was the owner of the property on the East side of the 
road in question, located immediately North of the land 
of Respondents. 
In that case the Court found that the road was a pub-
lic road and that it was forty-six feet in width. This case 
has not been reversed or the Decree modified. Up until 
1924 ,at a point approximately forty ( 40) feet South of 
the North boundary of what is now the Thompson prop-
erty, an artificial pond protruded from what is now the 
Thompson property into the road a distance of some 
twenty (20) to twenty-five (25) feet, and there was no 
fence separating the pond from the traveled portion of 
the road. About 1924 the then owner of what is now the 
'rhompson property caused most of the pond protruding 
into the road to be filled with dirt which he took from 
other parts of the roadway and he then constructed a 
fence, to divide the remaining portion of the pond from 
3 
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the roadway, at a point approximately forty ( 40) feet 
East of the West fence line of the then road. Some three 
(3) or four ( 4) years later a different owner of the now 
Thompson property moved a building from the North-
easterly portion of the now Thompson land out into what 
was then the East half of the road and built a fence 
along the West side of the garage at a point approxi-
mately twenty-five (25) feet East of the West line of the 
road to a point approximately forty ( 40) feet South of 
the North boundary line of the property. The fence went 
thence East approximately twenty-five (25) feet and 
thence North to the North boundary line. At the same 
time he planted some trees along this fence line North of 
his garage. Subsequently, the fence was moved back to 
its previous location at a point some forty ( 40) feet East 
of the West line of the road. The trees and the garage 
have remained in their present position since about 1928. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
IS THERE A PUBLIC ROAD RUNNING NORTH 
AND SOUTH BETWEEN THE PROPERTY OF 
APPELLANTS AND THE PROPERTY OF 
DEFENDANTS? 
PoiNT~ II. 
IF THERE IS A PUBLIC ROAD AT THE PLACE 
INDICATED IN POINT I, WHERE IS THE EAST 
BOUNDARY OF THE ROAD AS IT PASSES 
ALONG THE WEST SIDE OF APPELLANT'S 
PROPERTY? 
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ARGUMENT 
rrhe two questions involved in this lawsuit are ulti-
mate questions of fact and the legal questions· are con-
cerned with the legal effect of the evidence in establishing 
the ultimate question of fact. 
PoiNT I. 
IS THERE A PUBLIC ROAD RUNNING NORTH 
AND SOUTH BETWEEN THE PROPERTY ·oF 
APPELLANTS AND THE PROPERTY OF 
DEFENDANTS? 
Respondents claim, and the Court so found, that 
Erekson Lane as it runs north and south between the 
property of Appellants on the east and the defendants 
on the west is a public road. 
First, let us refer to the Decree entered in Case No. 
40279 in 1928 by Judge Chris Mathison. In this case 
Judge :Mathison found that Erekson Lane from the north 
boundary of appellant's property to Vine Street to be a 
public road 46 feet wide. The road as it passes appel-
lant's property is bounded on the west by an old fence 
surrounded by a privet hedge. The east boundary is iden-
tified by a fence 50 feet east of the west fence for the 
northerly 40 feet. It then jogs west 10 feet and the fence 
then runs at a distance of 40 feet from the west fence to 
the garage. The west line of the garage is approximately 
25 feet from the west line, then the fence from the south 
side of the garage runs in a southeasterly direction. A p-
pellants did not at any time contend that there was ever 
5 
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a fence or any other obstruction in the road, or that it was 
ever narrower than 50 feet for the north 40 feet of 
appellant's property. 
The abstract of title of Respondent Crabtree is in 
evidence as Defendant's Exhibit 12. This abstract dis-
closes that the Patent was issued in 1891, but as far back 
as June 26, 1875, the patentee conveyed the property of 
Defendant Crabtree, and commenced the description as 
follows: 
''Beginning at a point in the center of a north and 
south County Road 4.12 chains true East from 
the northeast corner of the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 17, • • • '' 
This Deed clearly indicates that the parties thereto con-
sidered that a County road existed at the point in ques-
tion, and in view of the fact that the patent to this land 
had not been issued, it could only have become a County 
road by user pursuant to the provisions of 43 U.S.C . .A. 
932, which provides: 
'' • ~ • the right of way for the construction of 
public highways over public lands not reserved 
for public uses is hereby granted.'' 
Patents are issued subject to existing rights of way, so 
respondents contend that there has been a County road 
at the point in question since at least 1875. 
The Erekson abstract, in evidence as Defendant's 
Exhibit 13, at Entry 3 identifies a north-south County 
road at the point in question, the Deed being dated in 
1901. The abstract of title to appellant's property in 
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evidence as Exhibit 7, and the conveyances running as far 
back as 1877 have the following opening the description: 
'·'Commencing in the center of an open street about 
four chains East from the Southwest Quarter of 
the Northwest Quarter of Section 17 * * *~'' 
(See Entries numbers 6, 7, 8, 12, 19, 21, 23, 28, 29, 30, 34, 
35 and 43) 
All of these descriptions, in addition to commencing 
in the center of au open street, also describe the west line 
of appellant's property as a straight line running due 
North and South. It is interesting to note also that the 
means of ingress and egress to and from appellant's 
property has been by way of Ereksou Lane, and if their 
right to the use of the lane was predicated on some type 
of a private easement, it is to be noted that there is noth-
ing in the abstract to indicate such private right, and 
there likewise is no grant of such right contained in any 
of the deeds of conveyance to said property. It is ack-
nowledged that the conveyances convey rights of way 
and appurtenances, but such a valuable right as the right 
of ingress and egress, if it were a private right, would 
certainly have been identified in the several conveyances. 
In addition to the documentary evidence above re-
ferred to, Respondent Clark, who resided in the property 
of appellants from 1935 until1953, testified that he trav-
eled from his home south along the lane to 5900 South 
Street four or five times each year. (Tr. 83) He testified 
that sometimes there were a couple of gates across the 
road, but that they were never locked. 
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Respondent Crabtree, who has been a continuous 
resident on the lane since 1934, testified that there was 
I 
between 50 and 100 persons who traveled through the lane 
each month during the entire period. (Tr. 106) He also 
testified that the County had used its snow removal equip-
ment to clear the lane; that at times they have graded the 
road (Tr. 108), and they have put in a culvert in the lane .. 
(Tr. 109) 
Joe Gillham, a witness called on behalf of respond-
ents, testified that from about 1890 until 1910 he was a 
member of the South Cottonwood Ward, and that in going 
to and from the meeting house would go East on 59th 
South to. Erekson Lane thence North along the lane past 
the property in question to the meeting house. (Tr. 134) 
That at that time there were no gates on the lane. 
Mr. Gillham, on cross-examination, stated that the 
lane was 50 feet wide as it passed the property of appel-
lants. (Tr. 135-6) That at that time there were no fences 
on either side of the lane south of the property of appel-
lants. He said that all of his neighbors traveled this same 
route, and he named some of them and indicated that 
they traveled on foot, or by team, surrey or buggy. 
(Tr. 133) 
Brent Grau:fi.n, called as a witness by respondents, 
testified that he was Principal of the Mid Valley School 
in the Jordan District, and was a nephew of Respondent 
Erekson's wife, and that from 1915 until1927 (Tr. 140), 
he spent many of his summers at the home of Respond-
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ent Erekson, and that he was very familiar with Erek-
son Lane, and particularly that part of it between appel-
lant's property and Respondent Crabtree. He prepared 
plaintiff's Exhibit 10 from measurements and field notes 
that he had made in connection with T. F. McDonald, a 
licensed surveyor, for whom he worked at odd times. He 
further testified that from 1918 to 1928 that nearly every 
day there would be carriages, and sometimes automobiles, 
traveling through the lane. ( Tr. 148) He identified some 
of the people who traveled through the lane, and that 
some people used it that he was not acquainted with, and 
that some would travel down to the creek and go fishing. 
(Tr. 149) 
Horace Godfrey, a witness called on behalf of Re-
spondents, testified that from 1890 to 1903 he frequently 
had occasion to travel through Erekson's Lane (Tr. 162), 
and that during that period he saw many other people 
using the road, and at that time the condition and width 
of Erekson Lane was comparable to that of Vine Street. 
(Tr. 167) 
Irene Litson Ottley, a witness called on behalf of 
respondents, testified that she had lived in the vicinity of 
6344 South 7th East since 1884, and she was very well 
acquainted with Erekson Lane (Tr. 168), and that on 
many occasions she traveled from Vine Street to 59th 
South by way of Erekson Lane, usually walking, but occa-
sionally riding in a wagon; that she saw many, many 
other people using the lane during the period, some of 
whom she named. ( rrr. 169) 
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Respondent J. T. Erekson testified that he had lived 
at his present address, 766 East Vine Street, since 1918, 
and that he can remember Erekson Lane for about sixty 
years. (Tr. 174) That the County had put gravel on the 
road at different times. (Tr. 182) That there has always 
been substantial travel through the lane (Tr. 175), and 
that the volume of traffic was fairly constant from 1900 
to 1920, but with the coming of automobiles there was a 
smaller volume of traffic because of having to ford the 
creek. (Tr. 176) 
James Orland Tho rum, a witness called on behalf 
of respondents, testified that he had lived at 482 East 
59th South since 1900, and that he had been acquainted 
with Erekson Lane for many years, and that from 1900 
to 1912 (Tr. 194), he traveled through Erekson Lane 
once or twice each week, and generally on Sundays he 
would :find other people using the lane at the same time. 
(Tr. 195) 
Earl E. Howe, a witness called on behalf of Respond-
ents, testified that he has been familiar with Erekson Lane 
for 50 years, and in response to the question by Counsel 
for respondent as to the travel on the lane, he answered·: 
''Yes. It is traveled considerably.'' 
James M. Dunster, a witness called on behalf of Re-
spondents, testified that he frequently had used Erekso11 
Lane (Tr. 205), and that he would bring beet pulp from 
West Jordan Sugar Factory to his home by going East 
on 59th South to Erekson Lane, thence North on Erekson 
Lane to Vine Street. 
10 
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more than sixty years last past, so the location of the east 
boundry of the road can best be determined as being at 
some appropriate distance east of the west boundry. This 
method is also indicated by virtue of the fact that the west 
quarter corner of Section 17, to which the surveys of the 
property in question has been tied, is presently repre-
sented by two different monuments, each of which pur-
ports to be the true quarter corner. (Tr. 110) 
The evidence shows without dispute that prior to 
1924 the garage was located on the easterly part of ap-
pellants' property, and there were no trees west of the 
pond. The evidence further shows that the artificial pond, 
which, prior to 1924, extended in to the 50-foot roadway 
some 20 or 25 feet, was filled in my the then owner of 
appellants' property, a man by the name of Shafer. (Tr. 
178; Tr. 146) Shafer filled the pond from dirt from the 
roadway. Prior to that time there had not been a fence 
between the road and the pond as testified to by appel-
lants' witness, Earl Home. (Tr. 201) After the pond 
had been filled in the then owner of the property, Shafer, 
built the fence between the pond and the road at a point 
40 feet east of the west fence line. (Tr. 202; Tr. 179; 
Tr. 147) About 1924 Schryver, the then owner of appel-
lants' property, moved the garage, which had thereto-
fore been a cow barn, out into the road, and a few years 
thereafter planted some trees to the north of there in 
the roadway. (Tr. 152; Tr. 178) Appellants apparently 
sought to establish their right to the land where the trees 
and garage were located on the basis, as attorney for 
appellant Clark stated: "By adverse possession and pre-
13 
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scriptive· use." (Tr.· 46) This very statement presup-
poses that prior to the time that the garage and trees 
were located at their present site the land in qustion was 
part of the public road. Their position has changed and 
now seeins to be that the road always ran to the west of 
where the trees and garage are now located. In other 
words, that Erekson Lane as it proceeded· southerly was 
at a rather uniform width of from 46 to 50 feet until it 
got to this particular point where all of a sudden it nar-
rowed to 25 feet, and after passing appellants' prope~y 
iinmediately widened out to a 40 to 50 foot road. It is sub-
mitted that there is no evidence whatsoever to support 
this proposition, but on the contrary, the only evidence 
is that the road was approximately 50 feet in width 
throughout its distance from Vine Street to 59th South. 
(Tr. 135; Tr. 181; Tr. 182; Tr. 146) 
On the question of width this Court has had the fol-
lowing to say : 
In Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Ut.1, Utah, 1941,116 P. 
( 2d) 420, the Court found a public way to be 60 feet in 
with in places and 5 rods in other places. 
''Before doing so, however, it is proper to observe 
that even as to pedestrians and vehicular traffic, 
where the evidence establishes dedication of a 
roadway as in this case, the width of such road-
way is not to be by the court measured by the 
boundaries of the beaten track. 'It was proper and 
necessary for the court in defining the road to de-
termine its width, and to fix the same according 
to what was reasonable and necessary, under all 
the facts and circumstances, for the uses which 
14 
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The appropriate law applicable to the above facts 
is as follows : 
Utah Code Anrnotated, 1953: 
Sec. 27·-1-1. "Public highways" defined. -
In all counties all roads, streets, alleys, lanes, 
courts, places, trails and bridges laid out or erected 
as such by the public, or dedicated or abandoned 
to the public, or made such in actions for the par-
tition of real property, are public highways. 
Sec. 27-1-2. Public use constituting dedica-
tion.- A highway shall be deemed to have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public 
when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years. 
Sec. 27-1-3. Highways once established con-
tinue until abandoned. -All highways once estab-
lished must continue to be highways until aban-
doned by order of the board of county commis-
sioners of the county in which they are situated, or 
other competent authority. 
The latest declaration of this Court on the subject 
is found in Boyer v. Clark, 7 U 2d 391, Utah 1958, 326 P. 
( 2d) 107, where the Court said : 
''The uncontradicted evidence in the instant case 
disclosed that for a period exceeding 50 years, the 
public, even though not consisting of a great many 
persons, made a continuous and uninterrupted use 
of Middle Canyon Road in traveling by wagon and 
other vehicles and by horse from Upton to Grass 
Creek and other points as often as they found it 
convenient or necessary. They trailed cattle, and 
sheep, hauled coal, and used this trail for other 
purposes in traveling from Grass Creek and var-
ious other points to and from Highway 133. This 
11 
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evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to estab-
lish a highway by dedication and the court erred in 
finding otherwise. The highway once having been 
established by such use, it is provided by statute, 
Sec. 27-1-3, U.C.A. 1953, that it '* * * must con-
tinue to be highway(s) until abandoned by order 
of the board of county commissioners * * * or other 
competent authority.'' There is no contention that 
any such procedure has been invoked here.'' 
See also: Wilson v. Hull, 7 Ut 90, Utah 1890, 24 P. 799 
Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Ut. 240, Utah 1889, 51 
P. 980. 
By virtue of the fact that the appellants offered no 
testimony whatsoever to contradict the testimony of the 
witnesses hereinbefore referred to, coupled with the fact 
that Counsel for appellants Clark predicated their claim 
to the land where the garage and trees are located, on the 
basis of adverse possession and prescriptive use (Tr. 
75-6), it seems clear that Erekson Lane is a public road 
and has been since prior to patent, and certainly the 
evidence amply supports the proposition that for more 
than ten years there has been continuous use of the road 
by the public, and there is no evidence of any abandon'" 
ment of the road by the county commissioners. 
POINT\ II. 
IF THERE IS A PUBLIC ROAD AT THE PLACE 
INDICATED IN POINT I, WHERE IS THE EAST 
BOUNDARY OF THE ROAD AS IT PASSES 
ALONG THE WEST SIDE OF APPELLANT'S 
PROPERTY? 
All of the testimony indicates that the 'vest boundary 
of Erekson Lane is now situated where it has been for 
12 
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were made of the road.' Lindsay Land & Live 
Stock Co. v. Churnos, supra. In Whitesides v. 
Green, 13 Utah 341,44 P.1032, 1033 57 Am St. Rep. 
7 40, in discussing the question here involved, this 
court said: 
" 'Counsel for the appellant appear to insist that 
the public have only a right to travel on the beaten 
path, and must be confined to one rod in width. 
We cannot agree with counsel that, where the 
public have acquired the right to a public highway 
by user, they are limited to such width as has 
actually been used by them. Generally, the greater 
part of the travel on a county highway is doubtless 
confined to the track made by vehicles, but there 
must be room enough for travelers with wagons, 
carriages, or implements to pass each other, and 
for necessary improvements and repairs to be 
made so as to keep it in a suitable condition. The 
right acquired by prescription and use carries with 
it such width as is reasonably necessary for the 
public easement of travel, and where the public 
have acquired the easement the land subject to it 
has passed under the jurisdiction of the public 
authorities, for the purpose of keeping the same 
in proper condition for the enjoyment thereof by 
the public. Such authorities are bound to keep 
the road open and in suitable repair, and, if ob-
structions be placed thereon, it is their duty to 
remove the same, and care for the rights of the 
public. • "" * The purpose for which the easement 
was acquired must determine the effect of the 
right parted with by the owner, and the width nec-
essary for the enjoyment of the highway by the 
public. Where the easement is acquired by pre-
scription or use such width must be determined 
from a consideration of the facts and circum-
stances peculiar to the case, because in such event 
the court cannot say that in law the highway is of 
a certain width, in the absence of statutory pro-
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VISion. "" * * Whatever may be the width in any 
particular case, the easement cannot be limited, 
when acquired by user, to the actual beaten 
path.' " 
"(3) Hence, while it is true as contended by 
appellant, that where dedication is established by 
user to which the way has been put measures the 
extent of the right to use, this limitation goes to 
the kind of use. A particular use having been es-
tablished, such width should be decreed by the 
court as will make such use convenient and safe. 
A bridle path abandoned to the public may not be 
expanded, by court decree, into a boulevard. On 
the other hand, the implied dedication of a road-
way to automobile traffic is the dedication of a 
roadway of sufficient width for safe and convenient 
use thereof by such traffic. '' 
Respondents content that the mere fact that a de-
pression in the earth has been filled with water to form 
a pond which projects into a public road does not cause 
the land under the water to lose its character as a public 
road. The mere fact that vehicles could not not travel 
through the pond is not conclusive as the width of the 
road. 
This Court has pointed out in Wilso·n v. Hull, supra, 
that where the evidence established 
''There were two or three sloughs, at rainy times, 
that were impassible; and that it was laid out four 
rods in width, and was upon the line hetween the 
sections • • * ' ' 
did not take the impassable portion out of the road, and in 
Din.dsa.y v. Churn,os, Utah 1930, 75 Ut. 384, 285 P. 646, the 
finding were, among others, that : 
16 
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"During the last four or five years the road in 
places has become impassable to ordinary vehicles 
and has been used only in driving animals, pack 
outfits, etc., over it.'' 
still it was a road. 
See also: Deseret Livestock Company v. Sharp, 123 
Ut. 353, Utah, 1953, 259 P. (2d) 607. 
Respondents contend that the pond extended into the 
road; first, the boundaries of both appellants and respond-
ents are a straight line as they abut upon the road; sec-
ond, the pond is an artificial pond; and third, Shafer, 
when the owner of the property, filled the part of the pond 
projecting into the road and built a fence along the east 
side of the fill, and this constituted a dedication or admis-
sion by the then owner as to the width of the road. 
Again, it is important to observe that the only ques-
tion before the Court in Case No. 40279 (supra) con-: 
cerned the existence of a public road, and its width be,.. 
tween the property of plaintiff and defendant in that case. 
It is the same question as the one involved in this mat-
ter except that it involves different parties, and at a point 
immediately south but upon the same road as Case No. 
40279. Whether the Erekson Lane is a public road be-
yond the property of appellants is not a question now 
before this Court. However, it is to be noted that Re-
spondent Erekson, who is the owner of the land upon 
both sides of the road between Respondents' property 
and 5600 South Street, has testified that it is a public 
17 
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road and hence it would be difficult for him at some future 
date to change his position. 
It is important to remember that all public roads are 
not through roads, many of them are cul de sacs. Appel-
lant Thompson has no private way on Erekson Lane, and 
Clark, who has reserved for himself the property south 
of the creek, has not reserved any way for him to get in 
and out of this property if Erekson Lane is not a public 
road. 
REPLY TO SPECIFIC POINTS IN THE BRIEFS 
OF RESPONDENTS 
Respondent Clark first raises the point that there is 
no evidence of any "formal dedication" of Erekson 
Lane. Section 27·-1-1, supra, indicates that dedication is 
only one of a number of ways in which land becomes a 
public highway. There is no provision in our statutes 
aside from subdivision ordinances of cities and counties 
wherein there is a formal dedication of a public highway. 
There is no contention by respondents that there was a 
formal dedication of Erekon Lane, but rather that' 'it was 
laid out - by the public -' ', and hence became a public 
highway. 
Respondent Clark then points out that there is no. 
evidence of any objection by the neighbors to the use of 
Erekson Lane. We assume that. he means there is no evi-
dence of objection by abutting property owners. This is 
true, but appellant thereupon concludes that it was a 
permissive use, and hence that no rights accrued either 
18 
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to the public or to the users as private citizens. This argu-
ment carried to its ultimate conclusion would deprive 
both of appellants from any use of Erekon Lane because 
there would be no public road and there would be no pri-
vate easement. We cannot believe that appellants intend 
to advance this proposition. On the other hand, if Erek-
soil Lane is a public road, as contended by respondents, it 
would be unusual to expect the abutting property owners 
to register any complaints because of the use of the road 
by the public. 
Appellant Clark's last point is that respondent Crab-
tree wanted the lane widened. This undoubtedly was wish-
ful thinking on Mr. Crabtree's part, but his position is 
that the lane should be restored to its original width, that 
is, the distance between the two fences prior to the time 
that the garage building was placed in the street and the 
trees planted in the street. 
Relative to the trees, it is unique to have appellants 
contend that by planting trees in a public street that they 
can thereby acquire some right in and to the street. It 
is common knowledge that trees are planted in the public 
highways by abutting property owners as part of their 
landscaping programs, and it is unique to have anyone 
contend that by so doing they can acquire an interest in 
the street adverse to the public. 
Appellant Thompson, on page 2 of his Brief, says 
the undisputed facts show that the maximum width of the 
land in front of appellants' property has been 24.6 feet. 
It is undisputed that the fences on the north 40 feet of 
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appellants' property have been 50 feet east of the west 
fence line. (Tr. 142; Ex. 10; Tr. 181) The foundations of 
the old coops fronting on the street are still intact; and 
the undisputed evidence is that the fence was fastened 
to these coops. 
The plats attached to Respondent Thompson's Briefs 
I 
are misleading, in that they indicate a road only 25 feet 
wide north of the Thompson property, whereas, the fact 
is that the Decree in Case No. 40279 establishes a road 
46 feet wide. Respondent Thompson at page 8 makes a 
point of the fact" that the users of the road can be placed 
in various categories. He seems to feel that people gomg 
to church are no longer citizens. He overlooks the fact 
that practically all of the witnesses testified that per-
sons used the street whom they could not identify, so it is 
difficult to see what category respondent -has placed these 
unknown persons in. He also fails to put Mr. Dunster, his 
own witness, in any category when he was hauling beet 
pulp through this road. On page 9 he makes reference to 
permissive use, and on page 12 to the_ planting of trees, 
both of which have been discussed above. On page 15 he 
makes reference to the fact that the culYerts, which are 
all north of appellants' property, do not extend the full 
width of the 46 foot road. We believe it is proper to take 
notice of the fact that bridges, culverts and siJ:nilar de-
vices for crossing water courses do not, except on the 
most recent and modern of highways, extend the full 
width of the right of way, and it is not unsual that this 
should be true of Erekson Laue. On page 20 he raises 
the point that respondents and the trial court are widen-
20 
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ing Erekon Lane. This begs the question. Respondents 
are trying to remove an obstruction from the lane and 
have its boundaries restored to their historic location. 
Section 78-12·-13, provides that there can be no ad-
verse interest acquired in a public road: 
''Adverse possession of public streets or ways. -
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or 
title in or to any lands held by any town, city or 
county, or the corporate authorities thereof, des-
ignated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, 
alleys, parks or public squares or for any other 
public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for 
any length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affir-
matively appear that such town or city or county 
or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or 
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real 
estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, 
and that for more than seven years subsequent to 
such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or 
successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, 
continuous and adverse possession of such real 
estate; in which case an adverse title may be 
acquired." 
Sections 27-1-12, -13, -14, -15, ·-16, -17, U.C.A. 1953, 
provide for methods by which the public authorities may 
romove encroachments from the public highways. It 
seems altogether fitting and proper that the Court in this 
action, in which private citizens are endeavoring to en-
force a public right, should apply the public remedy to 
the removal of the obstructions. 
21 
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Finally, the point is made that beyond and to the 
south of that part of the road now under consideration 
there have from time to time been gates placed across the 
road. These gates have not been in existence contin-
uously bcause witness Dunster testified there were no 
gates there when he traveled the road in the 1890's. The 
evidence is undisputed that the gates were not closed 
except on rare occasions and were never locked. This 
Court considered this problem in the case of Sullivan v. 
Conda.s, 76 Ut. 595, Utah 1930, 290 P. 954, where the road 
was established in much the same way as Erekson Lane, 
and on this the Court had the following to say: 
''There is ample and satisfactory evidence to show 
that as early as 1873 the roadway extended up and 
down the canyon over the lands now owned by the 
plaintiffs and the defendant and others, while such 
lands were a part of the public domain, and was 
traveled and used by the public generally as occa-
sion required in going up and down the canyon. 
The patent to the land issued to the predecessors 
in interest of the plaintiffs was issued in 1906, 
about thirty-three years thereafter. The plain-
tiffs acquired their interest in the lands in 1922 
or in 1924. The right of way having been estab-
lished over public lands by public user, the pre-
decessors of the plaintiffs when the patent was 
issued to them, and the plaintiffR when they 
acquired their interest in and to the lands, took 
them subject to the easement in favor of the public, 
unless it was thereafter extinguished by operation 
of the state law, which was not done." 
Relative to the gates maintained by plaintiff, the Court 
had the following to say : 
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"A further point is made that gates were put up 
by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest, 
thereby indicating that the character of the road-
way was a private roadway and interrupted the 
use of it. But there is ample evidence to show that 
whatever gates or fences were put up were erected 
after the roadway had for many years been estab-
lished and used as a public highway by the public 
generally and by those who had occasion to use it 
and was so continued to be used after as before 
whatever gates or fences were erected.'' 
The New Hampshire Court held that an owner cannot bar 
use of a public way once established by putting up bars 
part of the time. Town of Windham v. Jubinville, 92 New 
Hampshire 102,25 A. (2d) 415. 
See: Bolger v. Foss, 65 Cal. 250, California 1884, 
3 P. 871, 
where, after the Court had found a way to be a public 
road had the following to say about gates: 
"The fact, as found, that in the fall of 1877 the 
plaintiff placed gates at the points where the road 
entered upon and emerged from this land, which 
did not prevent the passage across it, does not 
overcome the effect of the finding that the road 
was used as a public road; nor does the fact that 
plaintiff, a 'short time' before he commenced this 
action, notified defendant that it was not a public 
road.'' · 
To the same effect see: Barnes v. Daveck, 7 CA 220, Cali-
fornia 1907, 94 P. 779. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents maintain that a public- street was laid 
out prior to the issuance of a patent and became a North-
South county road pursuant to 43 U.S.C.A. 932, and in 
addition thereto, the evidence conclusively shows user 
for more than ten years prior to 1900 and continuous use 
since. There is no evidence of any abandonment of the 
road by any duly constituted public authority or other-
wise, and Erekson Lane is now and for many years last 
past has been a public street. That fifty feet is a rea-
sonable and necessary width of the street and the 
encroachment of the ponds at one time as an artificial 
obstacle is no eidence of a narrower width. That estab-
lished fence lines justify a finding of a fifty-foot width, 
and that the use of gates by Erekson have not at any time 
interfered with the public use of the street, and could 
not under the law interfere with its use. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOFFAT, IVERSON and ELGGREN 
By D. HowE MoFFAT 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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